SC on Service Tax Audit

Apex Court stays Delhi HC's judgment of 'Mega Cabs' on service tax audit

September 30, 2016[2016] 73 taxmann.com 402 (SC)

Service Tax : Judgment of Delhi High Court quashing rule 5A(2) of Service Tax Rules, 1994 and holding service tax audits as invalid, has been stayed by Supreme Court; hence, for time being, service tax audits may continue

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[2016] 73 taxmann.com 402 (SC)

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Union of India

v.

Mega Cabs (P.) Ltd.

Madan B. Lokur AND DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.

Petition(s) for Special Leave to
Appeal (C) no(S). 26675 of 2016

SEPTEMBER  26, 2016 

Rule 5A , read with rule 5 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and sections 72, 72A, 73, 82 and 94(2)(k) of the Finance Act, 1994 - Audit - Service Tax - Submission of Records - Rule 5A(2) was amended w.e.f. 5-12-2014 authorising officers of Service Tax Department or audit party to seek production of documents on demand and Circulars 181/7/2014-ST and Circular 995/2/2015-CX were issued power of audit and audit norms - Assessee challenged said rule and Circulars on ground that there is no power of audit with service tax authorities and only audit under Section 72A can be conducted by Chartered/Cost Accountants - High Court held that : (A) there is no general power with service tax authorities to conduct audit; (B) word 'verify' in section 94(2)(k) empowers verification of records and does not empower 'audit' of records, as audit is an specialized function and cannot be entrusted to any and every officer of department; (C) moreover, 'records' would mean 'records' required to be kept under rule 5(2), therefore, rule 5A(2) requiring even furnishing of 'audit reports' exceeds mandate of 'records'; and (D) hence, Rule 5A(2) and two Circulars were ultra vires and quashed - On Revenue's Special Leave Petition before Supreme Court - HELD : Notice be issued in petition - In meanwhile, there shall be a stay of operation of judgment of High Court. [Para 3] [Partly in favour of Revenue]

Circulars and Notifications : Notification No. 23/2014-ST, dated 5-12-2014, Circular No. 181/7/2014-ST dated 10-12-2014, Circular No. 995/2/2015-CX dated 27th February 2015

CASE REVIEW

 

Mega Cabs (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [2016] 70 taxmann.com 51 (Delhi) - stayed.

Mukul Rohatgi, AG, Rupesh Kumar, Subash C. Acharya, Ms. Diksha Rai, Nikhil Rohatgi, Mohit Khubchandani, Advs. and B. Krishna Prasad, AOR for the Petitioner. J.K. Mittal, Rajveer Singh, Advs. and Praveen Swarup, AOR for the Respondent.

ORDER

 

Issue notice.

Mr. J.K. Mittal, learned counsel accepts notice on behalf of the sole respondent.

In the meanwhile, there shall be a stay of the operation of the impugned judgment and order dated 3.6.2016 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition(C) No.5192 of 2015.

Tag with Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.34872 of 2014

ICAI Cannot restrict number of audits

Case Name : Shaji Poulose,Chartered Accountant Vs. ICAI (Kerala High Court)

Appeal Number : WP(C).No.25662/2016(G)

Date of Judgement/Order : 03/08/2016

Hon’ble High Court of Kerala has stayed the disciplinary proceedings initiated by ICAI against CA Shaji Poulose for exceeding the limit on number of tax audits.

ICAI Cannot restrict number of audits as it has no power to issue such direction. Only statute can impose restrictions.

Assessee cannot be asked to reverse input tax credit due to non-payment of taxes by the selling dealers

PATH BREAKING JUDGEMENT

Assessee cannot be asked to reverse input tax credit due to non-payment of taxes by the selling dealers

Sri Lakshmi Textiles Vs. the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Others [2016 (1) TMI 329 – MADRAS HIGH COURT]

Facts:

Sri Lakshmi Textiles(“the Petitioner”) is a partnership firm engaged in the business of inner garments and textiles registered under Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 (“TN Vat Act”). The Petitioner was regularly filing the VAT return and paying the VAT liability after adjusting the corresponding input tax credit. For the Assessment Year 2013-2014, the Petitioner had reported total turnover and taxable turnover of Rs. 2,02,88,151/- and Rs. 15,98,693/- respectively in his return.

The Department alleged that because some of the selling dealer of the Petitioner had not paid the tax, the Petitioner is required to reverse the corresponding input tax credit and further sought to levy penalty under Section 27(3) of the TN VAT Act on the Petitioner.

Held:

The Hon’ble High Court of Madras relied upon the decision in the case of Sri Vinayaga Agencies Vs. the Assistant Commissioner (Ct), Chennai and another [(2013) 60 VST 283 (Mad)] and held that when the fact of Petitioner paying the taxes to his supplier is not under dispute, the Petitioner cannot be compelled to reverse the input tax Credit due to non-payment of VAT liability by the selling dealership

SC : Tips collected by hotel from customers and paid to employees couldn't be taxable as salary

Issue

"Whether tips collected by a hotel from customers and paid to employees could be chargeable as salary in hands of employees?"

The Supreme Court held as under-

(1)   Section 15 of the Income-tax Act which talks about salaries provides that there should be a vested right in an employee to claim any salary from an employer. (2)   Tips being purely voluntary amounts that may or may not be paid by customers for services rendered to them would not fall under Section 15 as there is no vested right in the employee to claim any amount of tip from his employer. (3)   Further, the said section provides that salary paid or allowed must have reference to contract of employment, i.e., an amount paid under contract of employment could only be treated as salary. (4)   In the instant case, the amount of tip paid by the employer to the employees had no reference to the contract of employment at all. Tips were received by the employer in a fiduciary capacity as trustee for payments that were received from customers which it disburse to its employees for service rendered to the customer. (5)   Hence, tips so disbursed to employees couldn't be chargeable to tax as salary.

ITAT accedes to ICAI's plea

ITAT accedes to ICAI's plea in Miscellaneous Application to modify/review its order wherein the Tribunal had strongly criticized the Institute's functioning;  Tribunal accepts ICAI's argument that that its observations in the original order about the CA profession and conduct of the students pursuing the CA courses, were not necessary to adjudicate the issues urged before it by the assessee;  Clarifying that it was not the intention of the Tribunal to target any particular person or the ICAI, modifies  para 9.6 of its original order that the Institute considered as "offensive"; ITAT in its original order, dismissed assessee's plea to condone a 2984 days delay in filing of appeal on grounds of 'improper advice' given by CA firm; While raising alarms over the reckless advice given by the CA firm, the Tribunal called on the ICAI to stem the"deteriorating standards" & "alarming practices" among some CAs; While modifying its order, Tribunal however reserves right to opine on important developments affecting the nation, observes   “... the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, being a part of Government of India, should not shut its eyes when it is noticed that certain developments occurring in the Country may affect the Country as a whole, more particularly when the reputation of particular profession, from whom the Tribunal is getting assistance in the dispensation of justice, is at stake.”;   Concludes that it would be incorrect to interpret that the Tribunal in its original order had commented upon the standards of CA profession or the ICAI, however as the said observations gave room for misinterpretation and thereafter resulted in controversies, replaces the same : Mumbai ITAT

The ruling was delivered by ITAT bench of Shri D. Manmohan and Shri B. R. Baskaran.

Validity of Sec 234E

G. Indhirani vs. DCIT (ITAT Chennai)

S. 234E: Prior to the amendment to s. 200A w.e.f. 01.06.2015, the fee for default in filing TDS statements cannot be recovered from the assessee-deductor while processing the s. 200A statement. However, the AO is entitled to pass a separate order u/s 234E to levy the fee within the limitation period
The Assessing Officer has exceeded his jurisdiction in levying fee under Section 234E while processing the statement and make adjustment under Section 200A of the Act. Therefore, the impugned intimation of the lower authorities levying fee under Section 234E of the Act cannot be sustained in law. However, it is made clear that it is open to the Assessing Officer to pass a separate order under Section 234E of the Act levying fee provided the limitation for such a levy has not expired

Case Law on VAT transfer to Service Tax

Interesting Case:

Where VAT has been collected without authority of law and Service tax demand also has been raised for the same period then the VAT Assessing Authority is liable to transfer amount of VAT to Service Tax Department

Idea Cellular Ltd. Vs. Union of India [(2015) 57 taxmann.com 293 (Punjab & Haryana)]

Idea Cellular Limited (the Petitioner) is engaged in the business of cellular services and as a part of its business activated SIM cards. The Assessing Authority collected VAT on the premise that activation of SIM cards was a sale.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. Union of India [(2006) 3 STT 245] held that activation of SIM card was a service and not a sale. Accordingly, the Service Tax Department raised demand of Service tax for the period, VAT was already been paid. Thus, the Petitioner approached the Haryana VAT Department for refund of the amount of VAT.

The Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana held as follows:

·         In terms of the Article 265 of the Constitution where the levy and collection of tax is without authority of law, the State does not have right to receive or retain taxes or monies realised from the Assessee without authority of law;

·         The Service Tax Department has raised a demand for Service tax for the period for which the State of Haryana has levied and collected VAT. In order to avoid double taxation, Haryana Vat Department was directed to forward the amount of VAT collected on activation of SIM cards to the Service Tax Department.

Case Law on Section 234E

234E Fee deleted in the absent of the enabling provisions u/s 200A

The Hon'ble Amritsar bench has given a landmark judgement on the issue of 234E Fee levied prior to June,2015 in the case of Sibia Healthcare Private Limited v./s Dy. Commissioner of Income-tax (TDS), in I.T.A. No.90/Asr/2015 and has deleted the addition-

The Hon'ble Tribunal held as under:-

" in our considered view, the adjustment in respect  of  levy  of  fees  under  section  234E  was  indeed  beyond  the  scope  of permissible  adjustments  contemplated  under  section  200A.  This  intimation  is  an appealable order  under  section  246A(a),  and, therefore, the CIT(A) ought  to have examined  legality  of  the  adjustment  made  under  this intimation  in  the  light  of  the scope of the section 200A. Learned CIT(A) has not done so. He has justified the levy of fees on the basis of the provisions of Section 234E. That is not the issue here. The issue is whether such a levy could be effected in the course of intimation under section  200A.  The  answer  is  clearly  in  negative.  No other  provision  enabling  a demand in respect of this levy has been pointed outto us and it is thus an admitted position that in the absence of the enabling provision under section 200A, no such levy  could  be  effected.  As  intimation  under  section 200A,  raising  a  demand  or directing a refund to the tax deductor, can only bepassed within one year from the end of the financial year within which the related  TDS statement is filed, and as the related TDS statement was filed on 19th February 2014, such a levy could only have been made at best within 31st March 2015. That time has already elapsed and the defect is thus not curable even at this stage. In view of these discussions, as also bearing in mind entirety of the case, the impugned  levy of fees under section 234E is  unsustainable  in  law. We,  therefore,  uphold  the  grievance  of  the  assessee  and delete the impugned levy of fee under section 234E  of the Act. The assessee gets the relief accordingly."

CA Prarthana Jalan

Source: Taxguru

Supreme Court Upholds NCLT

Supreme Court upholds the constitutional validity of National Company Law Tribunal

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 1072 OF 2013

MADRAS BAR ASSOCIATION

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

This writ petition filed by the petitioner, namely, the Madras Bar Association, is sequel to the earlier proceedings which culminated in the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association¹ (hereinafter referred to as the '2010 judgment'). In the earlier round of litigation, the petitioner had challenged the constitutional validity of creation of National Company Law Tribunal ('NCLT' for short) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal ('NCLAT' for short), along with certain other provisions pertaining thereto which were incorporated by the Legislature in Parts 1 B and 1 C of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1956′) by Companies (Second Amendment) Act,2002.

2) Writ petition, in this behalf, was filed by the petitioner in the High Court of Madras which culminated into the judgment dated 30.03.2004. The High Court held that creation of NCLT and vesting the powers hitherto exercised by the High Court and the Company Law Board ('CLB' for short) in the said Tribunal was not unconstitutional. However, at the same time, the High Court pointed out certain defects in various provisions of Part 1B and Part 1C of the Act, 1956 and, in particular, in Sections 10FD(3)(f)(g)(h), 10FE, 10FF, 10FL(2), 10FR(3), 10FT. Declaring that those provisions as existed offended the basic Constitutional scheme of separation of powers, it was held that unless these provisions are appropriately amended by removing the defects which were also specifically spelled out, it would be unconstitutional to constitute NCLT and NCLAT to exercise the jurisdiction which is being exercised by the High Court or the CLB. The petitioner felt aggrieved by that part of the judgment vide which establishments of NCLT and NCLAT was held to be Constitutional. On the other hand, Union of India felt dissatisfied with the other part of the judgment whereby aforesaid provisions contained in Parts 1 B and 1 C of the Act, 1956 were perceived as suffering from various legal and Constitutional infirmities. Thus, both Union of India as well as the petitioner filed appeals against that judgment of the Madras High Court. Those appeals were decided by the Constitution Bench, as mentioned above. 

Guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Sahkari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd vs. ACIT (Gujarat High Court).

Guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Sahkari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd vs. ACIT (Gujarat High Court). S. 147: Strict guidelines laid down to streamline procedure for reopening of assessments There are four important stages once the AO issues notice for reopening of the assessment. Such stages are: (i) the assessee if he so wishes, may demand the reasons recorded by the AO after filing return in response to notice u/s 148 of the Act, (ii) the AO supplying such reasons to the assessee, (iii) the assessee raising objections to the notice for reopening and (iiii) the AO disposing of the objections raised by the assessee. With a view to streamlining this procedure, and to ensure, as far as possible, the AO is not faced with the unenviable task of completing the assessment proceedings in a few days left before the same became time barred, we would like to give certain directions of general implication which, we would expect, are followed by all concerned. While doing so, we are conscious that these stages are provided by the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd 259 ITR 19 and we would be giving directions only to the extent the said judgment already does not provide for. We have noticed that considerably long time is consumed sometimes by the assessee demanding the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer and sometimes the AO complying with such a request of the assessee. It is an accepted proposition that the reasons recorded by the AO are not confidential and the assessee whose assessment is being reopened has a right to know such reasons. We therefore thought that these two stages can be substantially eliminated by giving suitable directions. The further stage is of the assessee raising objections which often times is done after much delay and the last stage comes where the AO deals with such objections. This is yet another problem area where unduly long time is consumed by the AO. Under the circumstances, following directions are issued. (1) Once the AO serves to an assessee a notice of reopening of assessment u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and within the time permitted in such notice, the assessee files his return of income in response to such notice, the AO shall supply the reasons recorded by him for issuing such notice within 30 days of the filing of the return by the assessee without waiting for the assessee to demand such reasons. (2) Once the assessee receives such reasons, he would be expected to raise his objections, if he so desires, within 60 days of receipt of such reasons. (3) If objections are received by the AO from the assessee within the time permitted hereinabove, the AO would dispose of the objections, as far as possible, within four months of date of receipt of the objections filed by the assessee. (4) This is being done in order to ensure that sufficient time is available with the AO to frame the assessment after carrying out proper scrutiny. The requirement and the time-frame for supplying the reasons without being demanded by the assessee would be applicable only if the assessee files his return of income within the period permitted in the notice for reopening. Likewise the time frame for the AO to dispose of the objections would apply only if the assessee raises objections within the time provided hereinabove. This, however, would not mean that if in either case, the assessee misses the time limit, the procedure provided by the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd would not apply. It only means that the time frame provided hereinabove would not apply in such cases. (5) In the communication supplying the reasons recorded by the AO, he shall intimate to the assessee that he is expected to raise the objections within 60 days of receipt of the reasons and shall reproduce the directions contained in sub-para 1 to 4 hereinabove giving reference to this judgment of the High Court. (6) The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and Cadre Controlling Authority of the Gujarat State, shall issue a circular to all AOs for scrupulously carrying out the directions contained in this judgment

TP Case of Shell

HC decides TP issue of undervaluation of shares in favour of shell; follows ratio of Vodafone's case

November 19, 2014

 

On November 18, 2014 the Bombay High Court held in favour of Shell India on the issue of applicability of Transfer Pricing provisions in case of issue of shares. In this regard, the High relied upon decision in the case of Vodafone India Services (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [2014] 50 taxmann.com 300 (Bombay). It held that Transfer Pricing provisions would not be applicable on alleged undervaluation of shares issued to foreign parent company, as there was no income arising there from. The High Court deleted the Transfer Pricing adjustment and the consequential interest in respect of alleged undervaluation of shares issued by Shell India.

Previously, the Bombay High Court on October 10, 2014 in the case of Vodafone India Services (Supra)held that issue of shares by assessee to its non-resident AE at a price below the fair market value would not give rise to any income from an admitted international transaction and, thus, Indian Transfer Pricing provisions would not be applicable on it.

BMR Legal acted as the briefing counsel on the tax litigation and transfer pricing issues for Shell. Mr. Percy Pardiwala, Senior Advocate, argued on behalf of Shell with the assistance from the BMR's Legal team.

Mukesh Butani, Managing Partner, BMR Legal stated as under:

 a)  "The Shell India case decided by the Bombay HC is a significant development. It follows the earlier judgment of Vodafone insofar as principles are concerned - the principle being that issuance of shares by an Indian company to its foreign parent is not eligible to transfer pricing provisions as there is no income arising therefrom.

 b)  The High Court held today that the legal principle laid down by the Bombay HC applies in the Shell case and rejected the Department's argument that the facts of Shell case were distinguishable from Vodafone's case.

 c)  The said decision is a welcome relief not just for Shell but for all MNC's who have faced the adjustment on share issuance. It is significant to note that the court did not hesitate on exercising its extraordinary power to issue a writ where alternate appeal remedy was available - in this situation as the court felt that the tax department clearly exceeded its jurisdiction to bring to tax a capital transaction."

Gokul Chaudhri, Leader, Direct Tax, BMR & Associates LLP stated as under:

"The Bombay High Court has decisively held that no transfer pricing or tax implications can arise on issue of shares by a subsidiary to its overseas shareholders. Upholding the writ petition of Shell India the court brought to a close the controversy that arose in January 2013 and has since worried investors. This decision follows earlier decision of the court in similar circumstances for Vodafone India. Investors should welcome this bold intervention and clear thinking of the court. Hopefully one of the tax thorns that troubled investors has been removed. Acceptance of this decision by the Government would be helpful to bring closure."

POA- Capital Gains

CAPITAL GAINS In favour of: Assessee Capital gains on sale of property cannot be assessed in the hands of power of attorney holder, when no consideration was paid to the actual owner at the time of execution of the power of attorney and the assessee had acted merely as an agent, since there was no transfer to or enabling enjoyment of property in favour of agent in any manner so as to attract Section 2(47)(vi). High Court Of Madras Commissioner Of Income Tax Vs C. Sugumaran : (2014) 90 CCH 0173 ChenHC Decided On: Nov 03, 2014

 

Vodafone TP Case

Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd vs. UOI (Bombay High Court) Neither the capital receipts received by the Petitioner on issue of equity shares to its holding company, a non-resident entity, nor the alleged short-fall between the so called fair market price of its equity shares and the issue price of the equity shares can be considered as income within the meaning of the expression as defined under the Act. The assessee, an Indian company, issued equity shares at the premium of Rs.8591 per share aggregating Rs.246.38 crores to its holding company. Though the transaction was reported as an "international transaction" in Form 3 CEB, the assessee claimed that the transfer pricing provisions did not apply as there was no income arising to it. The AO referred the issue to the TPO without dealing with the preliminary objection. The TPO held that he could not go into the issue whether income had arisen or not because his jurisdiction was limited to determine the ALP. He held that the assessee ought to have charged the NAV of the share (Rs. 53,775) and that the difference between the NAV and the issue price was a deemed loan from the assessee to the holding company for which the assessee ought to have received 13.5% interest. He accordingly computed the adjustment for the shares premium at Rs. 1308 crore and the interest thereon at Rs. 88 crore. The AO passed a draft assessment order u/s 144C(1) in which he held that he was bound u/s 92-CA(4) with the TPO's determination and could not consider the contention whether the transfer pricing provisions applied. The assessee filed a Writ Petition challenging the jurisdiction of the TPO/AO to make the adjustment. The High Court directed the DRP to decide the assessee's objection regarding chargeability of alleged shortfall in share premium as a preliminary issue. Upon the DRP's decision, the assessee filed another Writ Petition. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition: (1) A plain reading of Section 92(1) of the Act very clearly brings out that income arising from a International Transaction is a condition precedent for application of Chapter X of the Act. (2) The word income for the purpose of the Act has a well understood meaning as defined in s. 2(24) of the Act. The amounts received on issue of share capital including the premium is undoubtedly on capital account. Share premium have been made taxable by a legal fiction u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act and the same is enumerated as Income in s. 2(24)(xvi) of the Act. However, what is bought into the ambit of income is the premium received from a resident in excess of the fair market value of the shares. In this case what is being sought to be taxed is capital not received from a non-resident i.e. premium allegedly not received on application of ALP. Therefore, absent express legislation, no amount received, accrued or arising on capital account transaction can be subjected to tax as Income (Cadell Weaving Mill Co. vs. CIT 249 ITR 265 approved in CIT vs. D.P. Sandu Bros 273 ITR 1 followed); (3) In case of taxing statutes, in the absence of the provision by itself being susceptible to two or more meanings, it is not permissible to forgo the strict rules of interpretation while construing it. It was not open to the DRP to seek aid of the supposed intent of the Legislature to give a wider meaning to the word 'Income'; (4) The other basis in the impugned order, namely that as a consequence of under valuation of shares, there is an impact on potential income and that if the ALP were received, the Petitioner would be able to invest the same and earn income, proceeds on a mere surmise/assumption. This cannot be the basis of taxation. In any case, the entire exercise of charging to tax the amounts allegedly not received as share premium fails, as no tax is being charged on the amount received as share premium. (5) Chapter X is invoked to ensure that the transaction is charged to tax only on working out the income after arriving at the ALP of the transaction. This is only to ensure that there is no manipulation of prices/consideration between AEs. The entire consideration received would not be a subject-matter of taxation; (6) The department's method of interpretation indeed is a unique way of reading a provision i.e. to omit words in the Section. This manner of reading a provision by ignoring/rejecting certain words without any finding that in the absence of so rejecting, the provision would become unworkable, is certainly not a permitted mode of interpretation. It would lead to burial of the settled legal position that a provision should be read as a whole, without rejecting and/or adding words thereto. This rejecting of words in a statute to achieve a predetermined objective is not permissible. This would amount to redrafting the legislation which is beyond/outside the jurisdiction of Courts. (7) In tax jurisprudence, it is well settled that following four factors are essential ingredients to a taxing statute:- (a) subject of tax; (b) person liable to pay the tax; (c) rate at which tax is to be paid, and (d) measure or value on which the rate is to be applied. Thus, there is difference between a charge to tax and the measure of tax (a) & (d) above; (8) The contention that in view of Chapter X of the Act, the notional income is to be brought to tax and real income will have no place is not acceptable because the entire exercise of determining the ALP is only to arrive at the real income earned i.e. the correct price of the transaction, shorn of the price arrived at between the parties on account of their relationship viz. AEs. In this case, the revenue seems to be confusing the measure to a charge and calling the measure a notional income. We find that there is absence of any charge in the Act to subject issue of shares at a premium to tax. (9) W.e.f. 1 April 2013, the definition of income u/s 2(24)(xvi) includes within its scope the provisions of s. 56(2) (vii-b) of the Act. This indicates the intent of the Parliament to tax issue of shares to a resident, when the issue price is above its fair market value. In the instant case, the Revenue's case is that the issue price of equity share is below the fair market value of the shares issued to a non-resident. Thus Parliament has consciously not brought to tax amounts received from a non-resident for issue of shares, as it would discourage capital inflow from abroad. (10) Consequently, the issue of shares at a premium by the Petitioner to its non resident holding company does not give rise to any income from an admitted International Transaction. Thus, no occasion to apply Chapter X of the Act can arise in such a case.

 

 

 

 

Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd vs. UOI (Bombay High Court)

October 10th, 2014

COURT:	Bombay High Court
CORAM:	M. S. Sanklecha J, Mohit Shah CJ
SECTION(S):	92CA
GENRE:	Transfer Pricing
CATCH NOTE:	Neither the capital receipts received by the Petitioner on issue of equity shares to its holding company, a non-resident entity, nor the alleged short-fall between the so called fair market price of its equity shares and the issue price of the equity shares can be considered as income within the meaning of the expression as defined under the Act.
CATCH WORDS:	share premium, Transfer Pricing
COUNSEL:	Harish Salve
FILE:	http://laws4.us/wp-content/uploads/vodafone_transfer_pricing3.pdf
DATE:	October 10, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE:	October 10, 2014 (Date of publication)

The assessee, an Indian company, issued equity shares at the premium of Rs.8591 per share aggregating Rs.246.38 crores to its holding company. Though the transaction was reported as an "international transaction" in Form 3 CEB, the assessee claimed that the transfer pricing provisions did not apply as there was no income arising to it. The AO referred the issue to the TPO without dealing with the preliminary objection. The TPO held that he could not go into the issue whether income had arisen or not because his jurisdiction was limited to determine the ALP. He held that the assessee ought to have charged the NAV of the share (Rs. 53,775) and that the difference between the NAV and the issue price was a deemed loan from the assessee to the holding company for which the assessee ought to have received 13.5% interest. He accordingly computed the adjustment for the shares premium at Rs. 1308 crore and the interest thereon at Rs. 88 crore. The AO passed a draft assessment order u/s 144C(1) in which he held that he was bound u/s 92-CA(4) with the TPO's determination and could not consider the contention whether the transfer pricing provisions applied. The assessee filed a Writ Petition challenging the jurisdiction of the TPO/AO to make the adjustment. The High Court directed the DRP to decide the assessee's objection regarding chargeability of alleged shortfall in share premium as a preliminary issue. Upon the DRP's decision, the assessee filed another Writ Petition. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition:

(1) A plain reading of Section 92(1) of the Act very clearly brings out that income arising from a International Transaction is a condition precedent for application of Chapter X of the Act.

(2) The word income for the purpose of the Act has a well understood meaning as defined in s. 2(24) of the Act. The amounts received on issue of share capital including the premium is undoubtedly on capital account. Share premium have been made taxable by a legal fiction u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act and the same is enumerated as Income in s. 2(24)(xvi) of the Act. However, what is bought into the ambit of income is the premium received from a resident in excess of the fair market value of the shares. In this case what is being sought to be taxed is capital not received from a non-resident i.e. premium allegedly not received on application of ALP. Therefore, absent express legislation, no amount received, accrued or arising on capital account transaction can be subjected to tax as Income (Cadell Weaving Mill Co. vs. CIT 249 ITR 265 approved in CIT vs. D.P. Sandu Bros 273 ITR 1 followed);

(3) In case of taxing statutes, in the absence of the provision by itself being susceptible to two or more meanings, it is not permissible to forgo the strict rules of interpretation while construing it. It was not open to the DRP to seek aid of the supposed intent of the Legislature to give a wider meaning to the word 'Income';

(4) The other basis in the impugned order, namely that as a consequence of under valuation of shares, there is an impact on potential income and that if the ALP were received, the Petitioner would be able to invest the same and earn income, proceeds on a mere surmise/assumption. This cannot be the basis of taxation. In any case, the entire exercise of charging to tax the amounts allegedly not received as share premium fails, as no tax is being charged on the amount received as share premium.

(5) Chapter X is invoked to ensure that the transaction is charged to tax only on working out the income after arriving at the ALP of the transaction. This is only to ensure that there is no manipulation of prices/consideration between AEs. The entire consideration received would not be a subject-matter of taxation;

(6) The department's method of interpretation indeed is a unique way of reading a provision i.e. to omit words in the Section. This manner of reading a provision by ignoring/rejecting certain words without any finding that in the absence of so rejecting, the provision would become unworkable, is certainly not a permitted mode of interpretation. It would lead to burial of the settled legal position that a provision should be read as a whole, without rejecting and/or adding words thereto. This rejecting of words in a statute to achieve a predetermined objective is not permissible. This would amount to redrafting the legislation which is beyond/outside the jurisdiction of Courts.

(7) In tax jurisprudence, it is well settled that following four factors are essential ingredients to a taxing statute:- (a) subject of tax; (b) person liable to pay the tax; (c) rate at which tax is to be paid, and (d) measure or value on which the rate is to be applied. Thus, there is difference between a charge to tax and the measure of tax (a) & (d) above;

(8) The contention that in view of Chapter X of the Act, the notional income is to be brought to tax and real income will have no place is not acceptable because the entire exercise of determining the ALP is only to arrive at the real income earned i.e. the correct price of the transaction, shorn of the price arrived at between the parties on account of their relationship viz. AEs. In this case, the revenue seems to be confusing the measure to a charge and calling the measure a notional income. We find that there is absence of any charge in the Act to subject issue of shares at a premium to tax.

(9) W.e.f. 1 April 2013, the definition of income u/s 2(24)(xvi) includes within its scope the provisions of s. 56(2) (vii-b) of the Act. This indicates the intent of the Parliament to tax issue of shares to a resident, when the issue price is above its fair market value. In the instant case, the Revenue's case is that the issue price of equity share is below the fair market value of the shares issued to a non-resident. Thus Parliament has consciously not brought to tax amounts received from a non-resident for issue of shares, as it would discourage capital inflow from abroad.

(10) Consequently, the issue of shares at a premium by the Petitioner to its non resident holding company does not give rise to any income from an admitted International Transaction. Thus, no occasion to apply Chapter X of the Act can arise in such a case.

Supreme Court on Sec 113

CIT vs. Vatika Township (Supreme Court – Full Bench) S. 113 Proviso inserted by FA 2002 w.e.f. 01.06.2002 to impose surcharge in search assessments is not clarificatory or retrospective. Suresh Gupta 297 ITR 322 (SC) overruled A search and seizure operation u/s 132 was conducted on 10.02.2001 pursuant to which an assessment order for the block period from 01.04.1989 to 10.02.2000 was passed on 28.02.2002 at a total undisclosed income of Rs.85 lakhs. Tax was charged at the rate prescribed in s. 113. Subsequently, a Proviso was inserted to s. 113 by the Finance Act 2002 w.e.f. 01.06.2002 to provide for the levy of surcharge at 10%. The AO took the view that the said amendment was clarificatory in nature and he levied surcharge by passing an order u/s 154. However, the Tribunal and High Court upheld the assessee's claim that the said amendment was prospective in nature and did not apply to block periods falling before 01.06.2002. However, the plea of the assessee was rejected by the Supreme Court in Suresh N. Gupta 297 ITR 322 (SC) (followed in (Rajiv Bhatara (SC)) and it was held that the said proviso is clarificatory in nature and applied to earlier block periods. When the present case reached the Supreme Court, the Bench was of the view that the issue ought to be referred to a larger Bench of 5 judges. HELD by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court:     (iv) There cannot be imposition of any tax without the authority of law. Such a law has to be unambiguous and should prescribe the liability to pay taxes in clear terms. If the concerned provision of the taxing statute is ambiguous and vague and is susceptible to two interpretations, the interpretation which favours the subjects, as against there the revenue, has to be preferred. This very principle is based on the "fairness" doctrine as it lays down that if it is not very clear from the provisions of the Act as to whether the particular tax is to be levied to a particular class of persons or not, the subject should not be fastened with any liability to pay tax.  (vi) Consequently, the conclusion in Suresh N. Gupta 297 ITR 322 (SC) treating the proviso to s. 113 as clarificatory and giving it retrospective effect is not correct and is overruled.

Case Law on Bogus Purchases

IT: Where purchases were supported by bills, entries were made in books of account and payment was made by cheque, said purchases could not be held as bogus purchases

IT: Commission paid through account payee cheques on account of sales canvassed by party was not bogus payment

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[2013] 40 taxmann.com 206 (Gujarat)

HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Commissioner of Income-tax-I

v.

Nangalia Fabrics (P.) Ltd.*

AKIL KURESHI and ms. SONIA GOKANI, JJ.

Tax Appeal No. 689 of 2010†

APRIL  22, 2013 

I. Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Cash credit [Unverifiable purchases] - Assessing Officer found that purchases made by assessee could not be verified as parties were untraceable - Accordingly, he made addition to assessee's income - However, Tribunal held that since purchases were supported by bills, entries were made in books of account and payment was made by cheque, addition should have to be deleted - Whether issue being based on facts, required no consideration - Held, yes [Para 4] [In favour of assessee]

II. Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Business expenditure - Allowability of [Commission] - Whether where brokerage commission was paid through account payee cheques for sales canvassed by a party and also in consideration of collection recovered from purchaser, said commission payment could not be held to be bogus - Held, yes [Para 6] [In favour of assessee]

Sudhir M. Mehta  for the Appellant.

ORDER

 

Ms. Sonia Gokani, J. - Aggrieved by the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dated 28.10.2009, revenue has challenged the said order in this tax appeal proposing following substantial questions of law:

"1.		Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is right in law in deleting Rs. 1,27,02,869/- made by the assessing officer on account of unverifiable purchases?
2.		Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is right in law in deleting disallowance of Rs. 72,37,808/- made by the Assessing Officer on account of brokerage commission?"

2. We have heard learned counsel Mr. Mehta for the revenue and learned senior counsel, Mr. Soparkar for the assessee-respondent. The first question pertains to the addition made by the Assessing Officer and reduced by 5% from the total amount of Rs. 1.27 crores (rounded off) by the CIT and deleted in its entirety by the Tribunal.

3. The question pertains to the purchases made by the assessee-respondent. On account of unverifiable purchases, the Assessing Officer made additions to the tune of Rs. 1.27 crores. He was of the opinion that none of the parties could be located and therefore, such purchases were held to be bogus. When it was challenged before the CIT(A), the CIT(A) was of the opinion that they could not be held bogus as the corresponding sales had been effected by the respondent in the next year. In subsequent year also and in the past, such purchases were made which were never questioned. When challenged before the Tribunal on the basis of the facts presented before us, it held that these purchases could not be held bogus by holding thus:

"13. We have considered the rival submissions and the materials placed on record. The purchases are supported by bills, entries in the books of account, payment by cheque and quantitative details Assessing Officer did not find any inflation in purchase price or inflation in consumption or suppression the production. The addition had been made only on the ground that the parties are not traceable. Assessee had made payment through crossed cheques and assessing officer did not find that payment made came back to assessee. Assessing Officer has made addition in respect to the outstanding amount as on 31.3.2001 which has been cleared in the succeeding years. The ratio of the creditor to the purchases is normal considering the past records of the assessee. The creditors were outstanding owing to liquidity as assessee is also required to get credit in respect of sales also. Even otherwise provision of section 68 is not attracted to amounts representing purchases made on credit as held in the case of Panchan Dass Jain cited supra. The addition for bogus purchases cannot also be sustained in full or in part in view of the various cases laws cited by the assessee and in view of the facts that the decision of Vijay Proteins Ltd. and Sanjay Oil Cake Industries are not applicable to the facts of the assessee's case. Assessee's case is covered by the decision of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in case of Kashiram Textile Mills. In view of the matter, addition made by the assessing officer is deleted. Ground No.1 of Assessee's appeal is allowed and ground No.1 of Revenue's appeal is dismissed."

4. The issue is essentially based on facts. The Tribunal, having been satisfied by genuineness of the purchases as also specially considering the payments made through the cheques, was of the opinion that such addition could not be sustained. Issue, essentially and pre-dominantly based on facts, requires no consideration as no question of law arises.

5. The second question pertains to brokerage commission of Rs. 72,37,808/- disallowed by the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer disallowed the commission on the ground that M/s. Shree Shantinath Silk Industries did not maintain its record and its name did not appear on sale bill. When it was challenged before the CIT(A) it was of the opinion that the only one party had been examined by the Assessing Officer and the person examined for and on behalf of such party in fact was not dealing with sales, and therefore, would not be having any knowledge of the brokerage. After dealing with the issue at length, it sustained addition of Rs. 36.18 lacs (rounded off).

6. When CIT(A)'s order was challenged before the Tribunal, the Tribunal deleted the entire addition by observing thus:

"23. We have heard the rival submissions and the materials placed on record. We are inclined to agree with the submission made on behalf of the assessee and find that no evidence had been placed on record that the commission expense is bogus. Assessee made payment of commission expenses is bogus. Assessee made payment of commission through account payee cheques for sales canvassed by the party and also in consideration of the collection recovered from purchaser. Payments cannot be unreasonable particularly when M/s. Shree Shantinath Silk Industries is not related to the assessee and so even disallowance made by CIT(A) is not proper. We therefore delete the full disallowance of Rs. 72,37,808/- made by the assessing officer. Hence assessee's ground of appeal is allowed and revenue's ground of appeal is allowed and revenue's ground of appeal is dismissed."

7. This issue is again based on facts. Essentially, the Tribunal has, with cogent reasons dealt with the issue, no question of law, much less any substantial question of law arises. The Tax appeal is, resultantly, dismissed.

POOJA

 

* In favour of assessee.

† Arising out of Tribunal's order dated 28-10-2009. 

TDS credit has to be given to the payee despite 26AS mismatch

Upon issue of Form 16A TDS certificate, TDS credit has to be given to the payee even if there is Form 26AS mismatch or deductor is at fault for non-deposit of TDS with Govt.

U/s 204, the liability to deduct TDS is on the employer / payer. U/s 205, when tax is deductible at source, the assessee shall not be called upon to pay tax himself to the extent to which tax has been deducted from that income. This means that the assessee / deductee is entitled to credit of such amount of TDS. Even if the deductor, after deducting the TDS, does not deposit the sum with the department, the department has to recover the said amount from the deductor and cannot deny credit to the deductee (Om Prakas Gattani 242 ITR 638 (Gau) &Yashpal Sahni 293 ITR 539 (Bom) followed)

Sumit Devendra Rajani vs. ACIT (Gujarat High Court)

Journal Entries-Sec 269SS

Journal entries should enjoy equal immunity on par with account payee cheques or bank drafts for the provisions of section 269SS

 
Date of Order: 27-6-2014 

 

Recently ITAT Mumbai in  Lodha  Builders Pvt Ltd vs. ACIT in (2014) TaxCorp(LJ) 3436 (ITAT)  held that Journal entries should enjoy equal immunity on par with account payee cheques or bank drafts for the provisions of section 269SS.

The ITAT held as under:

It is clear that the journal entries are hit by the relevant provisions of section 269SS of the Act. However, it is the finding of the Hon‟ble High court that completing the "empty formalities" of payments and repayments by issuing/receiving cheque to swap/squire up the transactions, is not the intention of the provisions of section 269SS of the Act, when the transactions are otherwise bonafide or genuine. Such reasons of the assessee constitute „reasonable cause‟ within the meaning of section 273B of the Act. In the light of the above ratio of judgment, we analyse the facts of the present case here as under.
 
There is no finding of AO in the order of the AO during the assessment proceedings that the impugned transactions constitutes unaccounted money and are not bona fide or not genuine. As such, there is no information or material before the AO to suggest or demonstrate the same. In the language of the Honble High court, „neither the genuineness of the receipt of loan/deposit nor the transaction of repayment of loan by way of adjustment through book entries carried out in the ordinary course of business has been doubted in the regular assessment. Admittedly, the transactions by way of journal entries are aimed at the extinguishment of the mutual liabilities between the assessees and the sister concerns of the group and such reasons constitute a reasonable cause.

In the present case, the causes shown by the assessee for receiving or repayment of the loan/deposit otherwise than by account-payee cheque/bank draft, was on account of the following, namely: alternate mode of raising funds; assignment of receivables; squaring up transactions; operational efficiencies/MIS purpose; consolidation of family member debts; correction of errors; and loans taken in case. In our opinion, all these reasons are, prima facie, commercial in nature and they cannot be described as non-business by any means. Further, we asked ourselves as to why should the assessee under consideration take up issuing number of account payee cheques / bank drafts which can be accounted by the journal entries.

This being the spirit of Hon‟ble High Court of Bombay, the ITAT adopts the same to the present issue. As such, the same is binding on us. What is the point in issuing hundreds of account payee cheques / account payee bank drafts between the sister concerns of the group, when transactions can be accounted in books using journal entries, which is also an accepted mode of accounting?

In our opinion, on the factual matrix of these cases under consideration, journal entries should enjoy equal immunity on par with account payee cheques or bank drafts. Of course, the above conclusion apply so long as the transactions are for business purposes and do not involve unaccounted money and they are genuine. In fact, such journal entries shall save large number of cheque books for the banks.

 
Further, There is no dispute that the impugned journal entries in the respective books were done with the view to raise funds from the sister concerns, to assign the receivable among the sister concerns, to adjust or transfer the balances, to consolidate the debts, to correct the clerical errors etc. In the language of the Hon‟ble High court, the said „journal entries‟ constitutes one of the recognized modes of recording the loan/deposit. The commercial nature and occurrence of these transactions by way of journal entries is in the normal course of business operation of the group concerns. In this regard, there is no adverse finding by the AO in the regular assessment. AO has not made out in the assessment that any of the impugned transactions is aimed at non commercial reasons and outside the normal business operations. As such, the provisions of section 269SS and 269T dof the Act shall not be attracted where there is no involvement of the „money‟ as held by the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in the above cited cases, supra. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, in our opinion, though the assessee has violated the provisions of Section 269SS / 269T of the Act in respect of journal entries, the assessee has shown reasonable cause and, therefore, the penalty imposed under Section 271D/E of the Act are not sustainable. Regarding an amount of „money‟ said to have been paid in violation of the said provisions, the same needs to be deleted,

SC on Sec 40(a)(ia)

Supreme Court dismisses IT Department's SLP on Vector Shipping Company case reported in 357 ITR 642 (ALL)

Section 40(a)(ia) disallowance is attracted only in cases of non deduction of tax at source on expenses payable. Non deduction of tax at source on expenses paid will not attract section 40(a)(ia)

Sale of Malba (Scrap) on demolition of structure thereon is a Capital Gain

Sale of Malba (Scrap) on demolition of structure thereon is a Capital Gain and not income from other sources, held by High court of P. & H. in the case of CIT, Jalandhar V. Ribu Saggi. The 'a' sold land and malba after demolition of structure. AO treated sale of malba as income from other sources. It was held by HC that there was extinguishment of right of the assessee, in superstructure leading to transfer of the super structure, within the meaning of Sec. 2(47). Capital gain was to be computed by deducting indexed cost of structure from sale value of malba. In the same case capital gain on sale of land was computed by under estimating Fair market value of land as on 1.4.1981 at Rs. 21000/- per Marla only, by AO, Tribunal directed to take FMV at Rs. 125000/- per Marla, after considering valuation by DVO and valuation got done by 'a'. HC held that valuation of land is question of fact based on material on record and there arise no question of law. Hence upheld the order of Tribunal to value FMV as on 1.4.81 at Rs. 125000/- per Marla. [2014] 45
taxmann.com 371
CA. Vinay Mittal, Ghaziabad

TDS Credit-Interest and Cost Payable

Assessee cannot be denied credit for TDS on the ground of Form 26AS mismatch because he is not at fault. Non-grant of TDS credit causes harassment, inconvenience & makes the assessee feel cheated. Dept to pay interest + costs of Rs. 25,000

The assessee filed a return in which he claimed a refund of Rs. 2.32 lakhs on account of excess TDS by the Government department. The return was processed by the Central Processing Centre (CPC) of the Income-tax Department at Bangalore and a refund of only Rs.43,740 was issued. No intimation was given to the assessee as to why the balance amount of Rs.1.88,630 was not refundable. The assessee filed an application u/s 154 for rectification of the mistake and asked for refund of the balance amount. As there was no response from the department despite several reminders, the assessee filed a writ petition in the High Court. HELD by the High Court allowing the Petition:

(i) The difficulty faced by the tax payers relating to credit of TDS was considered by the Delhi High Court in Court On its Own Motion vs. CIT 352 ITR 273 and the CBDT was directed to issue directions with regard to giving credit of unmatched and mismatched TDS certificates. Pursuant thereto, the CBDT issued Instruction No.5 of 2013 dated 8.7.2013 directing that where the assessee approaches the AO with requisite details and particulars in the form of TDS certificate as evidence against any mismatch amount the AO would verify whether or not the deductor had made payment of the TDS in the government account and, in the event, the payment had been made, credit of the same would be given to the assessee.

(ii) On facts, no effort has been made by the AO to verify whether the deductor had made the payment of the TDS in the government account. On the other hand, the Income-tax department has shown helplessness in not refunding the amount on the sole ground that the details of the TDS did not match with the details shown in Form 26AS. There is a presumption that the deductor has deposited TDS amount in the government account especially when the deductor is a government department. By denying the benefit of TDS to the Petitioner because of the fault of the deductor causes not only harassment and inconvenience, but also makes the assessee feel cheated. There is no fault on the part of the Petitioner. The fault, if any, lay with the deductor. The mismatching is not attributable to the assessee. The department must refund the amount within 3 weeks with interest. The department must also pay costs of Rs. 25,000 to the Petitioner.